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Note
A LAWYER'S DUTY NOT TO AID THE
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW-
CANON 3 AND THE CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
I. INTRODUCTION
The Code of Professional Responsibility' represents an attempt
by the American Bar Association to update,2 organize, and clarify
1. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1969) [hereinafter re-
ferred to as "the Code" and cited as ABA CODE]. On May 20, 1970 the Code
was adopted by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania; see S. Ct. Rules Docket
no. 1, p. 10, 438 Pa. XXV (1970). The Code has since been incorporated
into the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure; see PA. R. Civ. P. following
Rule 205. It is important to note that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
adoption of the Code's disciplinary rules gives these rules force of law in
the Commonwealth. In contrast, where ethical standards, promulgated by
the professional bar, have not been formally adopted by a state's legislature
or supreme court, the courts of such jurisdiction have on occasion refused
to discipline lawyers for violation of ethical standards. See generally
DRiaNKE, LEGAL ETmcs 26-30 (1953) [hereinafter cited as DRINKER]; 7 C.J.S.
Attorney and Client § 58 (1937); 7 AM. JuR. 2d Attorneys at Law § 38
(1963).
2. The Code incorporates recognized changes in general rules govern-
ing the authorized practice of law, especially such changes which have rede-
fined state power to regulate the practice of law within its own boundaries.
In the past this power has been used to restrict both the manner and form in
which legal services were provided to the public. See Auto Club of Mis-
souri v. Hoffmeister, 338 S.W.2d 348 (Mo. App. 1960) (attorneys may not
be employed by club to provide legal assistance to club members); Hilde-
brand v. State Bar of California, 36 Cal. 2d 504, 225 P.2d 508 (1950) (law-
yers may not properly participate in plan by labor union to provide mem-
bers with legal services for the prosecution of member personal injury
claim). The rationale given for such prohibitions has been the need to as-
sure that the public will be provided with only competent legal assistance,
from qualified attorneys whose allegiance to the client is not adulterated
by some paramount employment relationship. See In re Maclub, 295 Mass.
45, 3 N.E.2d 272 (1936). However, federal decisions within the past fifteen
years have significantly narrowed the scope of state control over the prac-
tice of law and the means by which legal services may be provided. See
N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (state may not prevent nonprofit
organization from retaining staff attorneys to aid persons involved in civil
rights litigation); United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S.
the miasma of ethical goals and standards contained in the forty-
seven Canons 4 and over thirteen hundred formal and informal
interpretive opinions5 previously put forth by the A.B.A. The
Code thus modifies and supersedes both its forerunner, the ABA
Canons of Professional Ethics,6 and past opinions of the A.B.A.
Committee on Professional Ethics construing the Canons. 7 The
Code's first deviation from the random format of the old Canons
has been the organization of various ethical goals and standards
under nine broad section headings, each section dealing with a dif-
ferent area of ethical concern.8 The second major innovation of
the Code has been the clear segregation of suggested goals of ethi-
cal conduct (aims to be promoted but not mandated by the Code)
from rules governing professional behavior (standards against
which attorney conduct is to be judged).9 Each section has thus
been divided into two detailed subsections, entitled "ethical con-
siderations" and "disciplinary rules", corresponding to ethical goals
and requirements respectively. 10 This absolute discrimination be-
219 (1967) (union has a constitutionally protected right to employ an attor-
ney, with approval of union member, to represent that member before state
workman's compensation board); see also United Transp. Union v. Michigan
Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S.
1 (1964). The Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards ac-
knowledged the import of these decisions by placing into the Code provision
for approved attorney participation in group legal services; see Disciplinary
Rule [hereinafter cited as DR] 2-103 (D) (5). For a brief analysis of other
innovations reflected in the Code see PATTERSON & CHEATHAM, THE PROFES-
SION OF LAW 43-44 n.19 (1971) [hereinafter cited as PATrERSON]; Sutton,
The Impact of the Code of Professional Responsibility upon the Unauthor-
ized Practice of Law, 47 N.C.L. Rsv. 633 n.2 (1968); see generally WISE,
LEGAL ETmCS (1970) [hereinafter cited as WISE].
3. WISE 6-7 (1970).
4. See ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETIcs (1953) [hereinafter cited
as ABA CANONS].
5. In 1922 the A.B.A. Committee on Professional Ethics was empow-
ered to issue advisory opinions on matters of proper professional conduct.
Since that time it has invited and responded to queries from other commit-
tees within the A.B.A., state and local bar associations, and individual mem-
bers of the A.B.A. When such queries regarding the Canons are broad and
general in nature, the responses are published as Formal Opinions [herein-
after cited as ABA Op.]. Formal Opinions to 1967 appear in ABA, OPINoNs
ON PROFESSIONAL ETmcs (1967). A second set of responses, called Informal
Opinions [hereinafter cited as ABA Inf.], deal with issues of narrow scope.
The texts of Informal Opinions issued prior to 1961 remain unpublished,
although some do appear in digest. See ABA, OPINIONS ON PROFESSIONAL
ETacs 11-197 (1967). From 1961 to 1969 the texts of select Informal Opin-
ions have been published in full. ABA, INFORMAL OPINIONS (1969).
6. See note 3 supra.
7. See note 4 supra.
8. The nine sections or areas of the Code have been loosely termed
"canons" by some, but properly speaking, the "canons" of the Code are
the general axioms which head each section and, as such, are the ethical
source from which disciplinary rules are supposedly derived. See CODE,
Preliminary Statement (1969). In contrast, it is the disciplinary rules of
each section which in fact correspond to the "canons" of the now super-
seded Canons of Professional Ethics. See CODE, Preface (1969).




tween the ends and the modes of ethical conduct was not even
approximated by the Canons of Professional Ethics, much to the
confusion of those seeking guidance from its pages.1 As the cap-
stone to its modification of its predecessor's format, the Code has
titled each of its nine sections with a "canon" that serves both
as a rough subject heading and a broad statement of the legal pro-
fession's responsibility to the public in a particular area.
12
Though the Code is intended to govern only lawyers' conduct,' 3
in implementation it also effects the layman in his association
with lawyers and the practice of law. Such associations arise
when the layman is employing, is employed by, or is acting
in concert with the lawyer. They also arise when the layman
stands simply as a third party to a lawyer-client relationship. The
proper extent of control, influence, and accountability between
lawyer and layman in such associations has thus been defined, or
at least suggested, by various standards and rules of the Code.'
4
11. JOHNSTONE & HopsoN, LAWYERS AND THEm WORK 57-59 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as JOHNSTONE]; see also Wright, The Code of Professional
Responsibility, 14 ST. Lou. L. Rv. 643 (1970).
12. ABA CODE, Preliminary Statement (1969).
13. ABA CODE, Preliminary Statement (1969). The Code, however
does not answer the question of who is a lawyer. Nevertheless, by modern
conception, a lawyer is more than merely someone who makes a living from
the practice of law, i.e. is more than the definition of what he does. Instead,
since the first formal organization of the national bar in the last century,
the term "lawyer" has come to mean one officially qualified in character
and education both to render legal advice and services to the public and
to represent another before a judicial tribunal. Particular "qualification"
to practice is judged by state bar examination or under special rule of court.
See, e.g., PA. S. CT. R. 11. Qualification, however, also includes formal ad-
mission to the bar of a jurisdiction. Without such admission, either by gen-
eral or special rule of court, one may not hold himself out as qualified to
advise or represent clients within that jurisdiction. See, e.g., PA. S. CT. R.
13; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1602 (1962). A lawyer is, therefore, more than
merely a layman learned in the law, but one both particularly and formally
qualified to practice law. See DRIsN 19-21, 59 (1953); 7 Am. JuR. 2d
Attorneys at Law §§ 1, 2, 8 (1963). However, exactly what qualifications
are necessary to become a lawyer, as well as what in particular constitutes
the practice of law, depends on the law of each state. See In re Griffiths,
413 U.S. 717, 723 (1973); Schware v. Bd. of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232
(1957); see generally AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE
STATUTE BOOK 16-21 (1962); AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE SOURCE BOOK 67-69 (1965); 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 3 (1937).
14. See, e.g., ABA CODE, Preliminary Statement (1969) (a lawyer, dur-
ing the course of representing a client, should be ultimately responsible for
the actions of his employees involved in that representation); DR 2-103 (B) -
(C) (a lawyer shall neither request nor hire a third party to make referrals
or recommendations of employment); DR 6-105 (A)-(B) (a lawyer shall
refuse to either continue or accept employment by a party when such would
adversely affect his independent judgment on behalf of another client); see
On the whole these standards and rules deal with the danger of
a third party coming between a lawyer and his professional
obligations or public duties. 15 In addition to these "conflict of
interest" standards scattered throughout the Code, there is one sec-
tion of the Code which, in the main, deals with the proper extent
of the lawyer-layman relationship within the context of the author-
ized practice of law. This section of the Code, headed by Canon
3,16 is the topic of this Note, with particular emphasis given to
DR 3-101 (A).
II. UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE AND THE LAWYER
A. The Mandate of Canon 3
The focus of the third section of the Code is the unauthorized
practice of law.17 Rather than deal with the actual offense known
as unauthorized practice,' however, this section of the Code
views the attorney's professional responsibility not to aid such
illegal practice.' 9 The avowed source of this professional respon-
sibility is the public interest, an interest which demands that legal
service be made available to the public only by those specially
also, e.g., DR 4-101(D); DR 5-107; DR 8-101(A)(3); EC 2-8; EC 2-21; EC
4-5; EC 5-14.
15. These areas were dealt with in the Canons of Professional Ethics
by ABA CANON 35: Intermediaries: ABA CANON 37: Confidences of a Cli-
ent; ABA CANON 6: Adverse Influences and Conflicting Interests; ABA
CANON 26: Professional Advocacy Other Than Before Courts.
16. ABA CODE, CANON 3: A lawyer should assist in preventing the
unauthorized practice of law.
17. Unauthorized practice of law refers to assistance given to another
in matters requiring legal training and skill not possessed of the average
layman, by one not authorized under law to give such assistance. See R.J.
Edwards, Inc. v. Her, 504 P.2d 407, 417 (Okl. 1972); Blair v. Motor Carriers
Serv. Bureau, 40 Pa. D. & C. 413, 423 (C.P. Phila. 1939); EC 3-5; see also
note 19 supra; see generally AMRicAN BAR FOUNDATION, UNAUTHORIZED
PRAcTicE HANDBOOK (1972). The phrase "unauthorized practice of law" is
sometimes confused with the notion of a lawyer's incompetent or negligent
representation of a client. Sutton, The Code of Professional Responsibility
and the Delivery of Legal Services, 45 PA. B. ASS'N Q. 362, 364 (1974).
However, the subject of incompetent representation is dealt with in a sep-
arate section of the Code. See CODE, CANON 6.
18. The offense known as unauthorized practice exists both by virtue
of state statute, see, e.g., PA. STAT. ANw. tit. 17, § 1610 (1962); N.J. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:170-78 (1971); CONN. GEn. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-88 (1960);
and by virtue of court created law, see, e.g., Shortz v. Farrell, 327 Pa. 81,
193 A. 201 (1937); In re Brown, 175 Ohio St. 149, 192 N.E.2d 54 (1963); In
re Baker, 8 N.J. 321, 85 A.2d 505 (1951). Instances of unauthorized practice
are brought to the attention of the courts most often by state and local bar
associations acting through their respective committees on unauthorized
practice. PArtnmsON 366 (1971); Cedarquist, Lawyers Aiding Unauthorized
Practice of Law, 28 U. P. Nzws 348, 354-55 (1968); Dulles v. Johnson, 273
F.2d 362, 365-66 (2d Cir. 1959). The various efforts both in and out of the
courts to control unauthorized practice are reported in UNAUTHORIZED PRAC-
TICE NEWS, a publication of the A.B.A.
19. See note 16 supra.
Note
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qualified to render legal assistance to others.2 0 In defining attor-
ney responsibility to the public interest, the third section of the
Code has also established certain rules that make it a lawyer's
duty not to undermine the public interest, i.e. not to assist prac-
tice of law by those not qualified. 21 Thus embodied in these rules
is the belief that without the lawyer's cooperation or acquiescence
much of what is called unauthorized practice would not arise.
22
The third section of the Code, from canon to ethical considerations
to disciplinary rules, articulates this belief in a spectrum of
resolve ranging from the exhortatory to the prohibitory, from the
"should" to the "shall not."
Written in the affirmative, Canon 3 stands in keeping with the
Code's declaration that its canons represent axiomatic norms,
standards of conduct expected of all lawyers. 23 Canon 3 urges ex-
pected action by declaring that a lawyer should assist in prevent-
ing unauthorized practice. Nevertheless, from the wording of the
canon alone it is impossible to determine in what form and with
what force this action should take. Framed in terms of "should"
instead of "must,' 24 and calling for the lawyer to "assist" rather
than "initiate" action, Canon 3 suggests not a course of conduct
but merely an ethical orientation. By reading the rules and stand-
ards following the canon, however, it can be seen that the action
Canon 3 urges is the avoidance of those situations that would give
aid to the unauthorized practitioner 25 or give rise to unauthorized
practice.
26
B. Ethical Considerations Under Canon 3
As the Code tells us, its ethical considerations are "aspirational
in character and represent the objectives toward which every mem-
ber of the profession should strive. '27 The thrust of Canon 3 is,
20. See EC 3-3; EC 3-4, see also Dauphin Co. Bar Ass'n v. Mazzacaro,
96 Dauph. 372, 377 n.2 (1974); Burch v. Mellor, 43 Pa. D. & C. 597, 600-
01 (C.P. Phila. 1942); Walker v. Kahn, 31 Pa. D. & C. 620, 622 (C.P. Allegh.
1938).
21. EC 3-3.
22. See ABA Op. 122.
23. ABA CODE, Preliminary Statement (1969).
24. The remaining canons of the Code are also worded in the nonim-
perative. The difference between the advisory quality of the canons and
the mandatory nature of the disciplinary rules of the Code has been ex-
plained as the difference inherent between the morality of aspiration and
the morality of duty. PATTERsoN 48 (1971). However, it is questionable
whether there can exist in the real world a morality of mere aspirations.
25. See DR 3-101.
26. See EC 3-8; DR 3-102; DR 3-103.
27. ABA CoD, Preliminary Statement (1969).
however, to direct the suppression of an activity, unauthorized prac-
tice, rather than to promote affirmative standards of professional-
ism. 28 The ethical considerations under Canon 3, therefore, can
present little that is aspirational in character. What they do
represent, though, is a preamble to and amplification on the
disciplinary rules of the canon.
The ethical considerations under Canon 3 basically divide into
two groups: the promotional and the pragmatic. The first group,
EC 3-1 through EC 3-4, describes (1) the public's need for com-
petence and ethical reliability in those who render legal services, 29
and (2) the danger inherent in entrusting legal matters to persons
not possessed of the qualities mentioned in (1). 30 It also depicts
both the trained professional judgment necessary to deal with legal
questions, 31 and the degree of accountability needed to insure com-
petence and loyalty toward one seeking legal assistance.3 2 The
conclusions suggested by these considerations are as follows: first,
only the lawyer, and not the layman, may guarantee qualified legal
assistance; 33 secondly, the practice of law by laymen runs con-
trary to the public interest;34 and thirdly, the public interest re-
quires discouragement of unauthorized practice.3 5 It is the promo-
tion of this public interest that is the apparent purpose of the first
four ethical considerations in Canon 3.36 It should be noted, how-
ever, that promotion of the public interest, as construed by EC 3-1
through EC 3-4, also means promotion of the legal profession. 7





33. See RESOLUTION OF STATE BAR OF WISCONSIN, contained in 38 U.P.
Nnws 173, 175 (1974) (where legal rights of parties may be at stake, the
public interest will not allow representation by one not admitted to the
bar); see also Walker v. Kahn, 31 Pa. D. & C. 620, 622-23 (C.P. Allegh.
1938) (competence and honesty of lawyer assured by fact that lawyer,
unlike layman, under constant scrutiny of court); Kephart, Unauthorized
Practice of Law, 40 DICK. L. REv. 225, 229-30 (1936) (protection of the
public from unqualified practitioners demands that legal counsel be pro-
vided only by lawyers).
34. EC 3-1.
35. See Dauphin Co. Bar Ass'n v. Mazzacaro, 96 Dauph. 372, 377 (Pa.
C.P. 1974) (public interest dictates that layman be prohibited from render-
ing legal services); see also Hall, The Fight Against Unauthorized Practice
Needs You!, 28 U.P. NEws 29 (1962) (as a service to the public, lawyers
must support the efforts of their local bar to suppress unauthoribed prac-
tice).
36. It has been stated it is the "public interest," and not the self-serv-
ing interests of the profession, which is the keystone of the Code. PATTER-
SoN 43, 369-72 (1971).
37. It has been frequently remarked that the reason for suppressing
the unauthorized practice of law is not to protect the legal profession from
competition, but to protect the public from the harmful consequences of en-
trusting legal affairs to unlicensed and untrained persons. See Burch v.
Mellor, 43 Pa. D. & C. 597, 600-01 (C.P. Phila. 1942); see also Littleton v.
Note
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The second group of related ethical considerations, EC 3-6, EC
3-8, and EC 3-9, define certain situations that may lead to unauthor-
ized practice. The first situation involves the delegation of legal
tasks to lay employees;38 the second deals with the payment of cer-
tain sums from attorneys fees to nonlawyers;39 the last situation
involves the lawyer's representation of clients in those jurisdictions
in which the lawyer has not been previously authorized to prac-
tice.40 The preceding situations comprise three circumstances in
which a lawyer may either unwittingly, carelessly, or deliberately
encourage or contribute to unauthorized practice.
Bridging the two groups of ethical considerations mentioned,
i.e. between the promotional and practical considerations of concern
generally to lawyers, is EC 3-5. It attempts to define what services,
though requiring special legal knowledge, a layman may be allowed
'to provide the public. Briefly, the consideration explains that
because the practice of law4 consists of those services requiring
the professional judgment of a lawyer, i.e. the trained ability to
Langlois, 37 Wis. 2d 360, 155 N.W.2d 150 (1967); Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb,
315 Mass. 176, 52 N.E.2d 27 (1943). Despite the apparent selflessness of
such declarations, there are those who have admitted that the suppression
of unauthorized practice is needed to protect not only the public interest
but the economic interest of the lawyer as well. See, e.g., Blair v. Motor
Carriers Serv. Bureau, 40 Pa. D. & C. 413, 419 (C.P. Phila. 1939); see also
Hall, The Fight Against Unauthorized Practice Needs You!, 28 U.P. NEws
29 (1962); Kephart, Unauthorized Practice of Law, 40 DicK. L. REv. 225,
230 (1936).
38. EC 3-6. An attorney may delegate tasks to lay office staff and
other employees so long as the attorney supervises the delegated work and
assumes responsibility for the work product. Id.; see ABA CODE, Prelim-
inary Statement (1969); ABA Op. 85; ABA Op. 316 (2); see also Comment,
Legal Paraprofessionals and Unauthorized Practice, 8 HARV. Civ. RIoHTS-CIv.
Lm. L. REV. 104, 118 (1973).
39. See EC 3-8, which discusses the impropriety of fee splitting ar-
rangements between lawyers and laymen. EC 3-8 does state, however, that
certain arrangements are allowable, e.g., payments by a law firm of the
value of a deceased partner's interest in the firm to the deceased's estate;
see DR 3-102 (A) (1)- (2). Also allowed are profit-sharing retirement plans
which include noniawyer employees; see DR3-102 (A) (3); ABA Op. 325.
40. EC 3-9; DR 3-101(B). Admission to practice in one jurisdiction
does not give a lawyer the right, ipso facto to practice in all other jurisdic-
tions. See People v. Fitkin, 170 Colo. 388, 436 P.2d 461 (1969) (prior admis-
sion to bar of sister-state does not give automatic right to practice in state
of residence); Ginsburg v. Kovrak, 392 Pa. 143, 139 A.2d 869 (1958) (no per-
sonal right exists, even under the privileges and immunities clause of the
Constitution, which mandates that an out-of-state attorney be allowed to
practice in-state absent admission to in-state bar).
41. In EC 3-5 it is implicitly recognized that because each state defines
the practice of law differently, see note 14 supra, any precise definition of
what constitutes the practice of law, for the purposes of the Code, is impos-
sible.
relate law to specific legal problems, a layman may properly give
services requiring specialized knowledge of the law, so long as these
services do not require a lawyer's trained judgment. To allow
otherwise, EC 3-5 holds, would violate the public interest. Never-
theless, EC 3-5 does set forth for the layman at least a rough defi-
nition of those skilled occupations he may pursue without engag-
ing in unauthorzed practice.
Because of the prohibitory tone of Canon 3, the ethical con-
siderations derived from this canon never clearly manifest their
purported aspirational purpose. Despite this, two affirmative goals
in the ethical considerations can be identified. The first appears
in EC 3-7, which advises that the profession has a duty to "help"
members of the public to recognize legal problems. 42 EC 3-7
further explains that the purpose of such help is to aid the public
to "understand why it may be unwise for them to act for them-
selves in matters having legal consequences. '43 The second affirm-
ative goal suggested under Canon 3 is found in EC 3-9 and relates
to interjurisdictional practice. EC 3-9 asserts in part that the legal
profession should strive to discourage "unreasonable" territorial re-
strictions on either the right of a lawyer to provide legal services for
a client or the right of a client to choose a competent attorney to
represent him. 44 EC 3-9, therefore, reflects the view favoring the
liberalization of state limitations on foreign attorneys advising
in-state clients in multistate transactions.
45
C. Disciplinary Rules Under Canon 346
Now part of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure,47 the
42. Cf. EC 2-2, which asserts that lawyers have a duty to assist laymen
in recognizing legal problems and should participate in educational and
public relations efforts concerning the legal system and various legal ques-
tions of public interest. These efforts may include professional articles in
lay publications, seminars, and lectures. But, attorney participation in such
programs must be accomplished without personal publicity, i.e. without
self-touting. Id.; see also EC 2-5; Note, Ethical Problems and Considera-
tions Arising from the Legal Profession's Duty to Assist Laymen to Recog-
nize Legal Problems, 22 CLzV. ST. L. REv. 504, 519-24 (1973).
43. EC 3-7.
44. It has been contended that the increasingly unitary quality of this
nation has bred the need for attorneys to be able to guide multistate trans-
actions as a whole rather than as piecemeal efforts dissected by state lines.
See PAwRrsoN 300-02 (1971). It has also been asserted that clients should
have ready access to legal specialists not otherwise available in-state. See
In re Roel, 3 N.Y.2d 224, 165 N.Y.S.2d 31, 38, 144 N.E.2d 24, 31 (1957)
(dissent).
45. See Appell v. Reiner, 43 N.J. 313, 204 A.2d 146 (1964) (where effi-
ciency and cost dictate that a single lawyer handle several complex multi-
state proceedings for a client, public interest demands an exception be made
to the general prohibition against out-of-state attorneys practicing in-state);
cf. In re Waring's Estate, 47 N.J. 367, 221 A.2d 193 (1966).
46. Discussion of the disciplinary rules in this part of the Note will
be limited principally to DR 3-101 (A) (aiding unauthorized practice of
law).
47. See PA. R. Civ. P. following R. 205.
Note
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disciplinary rules under Canon 348 have the force of law in
Pennsylvania 49 and violations carry particular consequences.50
Though dealing with preventing aid of unauthorized practice, 51
these rules of discipline, as part of the Code, are binding only on
lawyers.52 Furthermore, while these rules purportedly represent
48. DR 3-101. Aiding Unauthorized Practice of Law.
(A) A lawyer shall not aid a non-lawyer in the unauthorized
practice of law.
(B) A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction where to
do so would be in violation of regulations of the profession
in that jurisdiction.
DR 3-102 Dividing Legal Fees with a Non-Lawyer.
(A) A lawyer or a law firm shall not share legal fees with a
non-lawyer, except that:
(1) An agreement by a lawyer with his firm, partner, or
associate may provide for the payment of money, over
a reasonable period of time after his death to his estate
or to one or more specified persons.
(2) A lawyer who undertakes to complete unfinished legal
business of a deceased lawyer may pay to the estate of
the deceased lawyer that portion of the total compensa-
tion which fairly represents the services rendered by the
deceased lawyer.
(3) A lawyer or law firm may include non-lawyer em-
ployees in a retirement plan, even though the plan is
based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrange-
ment.
DR 3-103 Forming a Partnership with a Non-Lawyer.
(A) A lawyer shall not form a partnership with a non-lawyer if
any of the activities of the partnership consist of the prac-
tice of law.
49. See note 1 supra.
50. See PA. S. Cr. R. 17-1 et seq.
51. It might appear that DR 3-102 (dividing fees with non-lawyers)
and DR 3-103 (partnerships with non-lawyers) have little directly to do
with unauthorized practice, yet, such is not the case. It has been held that
division of legal fees must be based upon a sharing of professional respon-
sibility for legal services. See DR 2-107; ABA CANON 34. Any division
of legal fees with a layman therefore implies that the lawyer has allowed
the layman some measure of participation in or control over the lawyer's
practice of law. See ABA Op. 294; ABA Op. 297; N.Y. County Lawyers
Ass'n Op. 42; see also In re Werblun, 22 Pa. D. & C. 617 (C.P. Phila. 1935).
It has also been felt that a lawyer who splits legal fees with a layman al-
lows the layman to represent to the public that said layman is at least vi-
cariously engaged in legal practice. Id. The danger of lay control over the
practice of law is likewise seen to exist when partnerships are created be-
tween lawyers and laymen. See ABA Op. 201.
52. See ABA ConE Preliminary Statement (1969). It can be argued,
however, that the conduct of one not permitted to practice before the bar of
a jurisdiction may nevertheless be judged in light of the prohibitions under
Canon 3 in force in that jurisdiction if that person is seeking admission, pro
hac vice status, readmission, or reinstatement to the bar. See DR 1-101
(maintaining integrity of the profession); PA. S. CT. R. 17-18 (reinstatement
of disbarred or suspended attorneys); ef. Florida Bar v. Zyne, 276 So. 2d
9 (Fla. 1973); In re Grimes, 494 P.2d 635 (Okl. 1971); State v. Kavanaugh,
52 N.J. 7, 243 A.2d 225 (1968).
"minimum standards of conduct,"53 they also set forth explicit ex-
ceptions to those standards.14 Thus the rules contain both prohibi-
tive and permissive rules of attorney conduct.
5 5
DR 3-101 (A), the specific rule under Canon 3 that forbids the
aiding of unauthorized practice, 56 is a paraphrase of Canon 47 of
the Canons of Professional Ethics.57 The policy behind this rule,
protection of the public from "unqualified"58 and unlicensed
practitioners, is stated in the ethical considerations.59 The appli-
cation of this disciplinary rule, is dependent on what acts constitute
the unauthorized practice of law and what attorney conduct will
be considered in "aid" of unauthorized practice.
(1) Unauthorized Practice Defined
States have the inherent authority to dictate who shall practice
law and what acts shall constitute the practice of law.6 0 It, there-
fore, follows that a state also has the authority under its police
power to forbid the unauthorized practice of law.6 1 Although
the legislature may enact laws establishing qualifications and pro-
cedures for admission to practice, 62 limitations on the right to prac-
tice,63 and specific exemptions from these laws,
4 in most states65
53. ABA CoDE, Preliminary Statement (1969).
54. See DR 102(A)-(C); see also ABA Op. 325.
55. The reason that the disciplinary rules reflect both prohibitive and
permissive standards of conduct can be explained by the fact that the ma-
terial under Canon 3 of the Code is a synthesis of the prohibitory language
of the old A.B.A. Canons and the exceptions recognized by the opinions in-
terpreting those canons. See WISs 56-59 (1970).
56. See note 48 supra.
57. ABA CANoN 47 stated: No lawyer shall permit his professional
services, or his name, to be used in aid of, or to make possible, the unau-
thorized practice by law by any lay agency, personal or corporate.
58. For a discussion of this term, see note 13 supra.
59. See notes 19-23 and accompanying text supra.
60. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722-23 (1973); see also Sperry v.
Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963); Dacey v. N.Y. County Lawyers Ass'n, 290 F.
Supp. 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
61. See, e.g., Ginsburg v. Kovrak, 392 Pa. 143, 139 A.2d 889, 892 (1958);
Childs v. Smeltzer, 31'5 Pa. 9, 171 A. 883 (1934); Dauphin County Bar Ass'n
v. Mazzacaro, 96 Dauph. 372 (Pa. C.P. 1974); McCarthy v. Panaccio, 49 Pa.
D. & C.2d 501 (C.P. Phila.-1969).
62. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1602 et seq. (1962).
63. It is unlawful in Pennsylvania for persons, real or corporate, to
practice law or to hold themselves out as qualified to practice law in any
state or nation, without having first been duly admitted to practice in Penn-
sylvania. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1608 (1962). In addition, collection
agencies are specifically prohibited from practicing law or offering to render
legal services. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 7311(c) (1973). It is also pro-
hibited for any judge of the Commonwealth to practice law in Pennsylvania
during his term of office. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1607 (1962). Further-
more, no alderman, district justice, clerk of court, prothonotary, or register
of wills may practice as an attorney in any case which may appear before
a tribunal in which he is employed. Id.
64. In Pennsylvania first class corporations may, through an attorney,
render legal services to corporate members. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1608
Note
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including Pennsylvania the ultimate authority to regulate the prac-
tice of law rests not in the legislature but in the judiciary.66 It has
been held, therefore, that legislative enactments regarding the prac-
tice of law can be, at best, only reiterations of judicial policy or
pronouncements on the subject.6 7  Furthermore, it has also been
held that neither the legislature nor any other governmental body
may encroach upon the judiciary's power to define and regulate
the practice of law, and cannot admit to practice, through law or ad-
ministrative rule, persons not deemed qualified under standards
set by the judiciary. s
In Pennsylvania three types of activity are said to compose
the practice of law: the representation of persons before judi-
cial and quasi-judicial tribunals; 69 preparation of legal documents;
70
and advising persons of their legal rights and duties.71 Despite the
(1962). Moreover, a corporation, organized for the stated purpose of ren-
dering professional legal services to the public, is allowed to do so through
its officers or servants who have been duly admitted to practice law in the
Commonwealth. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2910 et seq. (Supp. 1974).
It is also permissible for "bona fide labor organizations" to give legal advice
to members in matters related to their employment. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
17, § 1612 (1962).
65. See 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client § 5 (1937).
66. See, e.g., In re Smith, 376 Pa. 253, 269, 101 A.2d 710, 716 (1954);
In re Schofield, 362 Pa. 201, 204 & n.1, 66 A.2d 675, 677 & n.1 (1949); Mont-
gomery County Bar Ass'n v. Rinalducci, 329 Pa. 296, 299, 197 A. 924, 926
(1938). The basis for this exclusive, judicial authority has been said to lie
in the separation of powers doctrine. Id
67. See Hoopes v. Bradshaw, 231 Pa. 485, 488, 80 A. 1098, 1100 (1911);
see also In re Shigon, - Pa. -, -, 329 A.2d 235, 240 n.14 (1974); cf. ABA
Op. 198.
68. See Rich Hill Coal Co. v. Bashore, 334 Pa. 449, 7 A.2d 302 (1939)
(legislation permitting union employees to represent others before Work-
men's Compensation Board held unconstitutional); Shortz v. Farrell, 327 Pa.
81, 193 A. 20 (1937) (administrative rule may not be lawfully construed
as permitting lay representation of claimants before Workmen's Compensa-
tion Board); Liebtag v. Dilworth, 25 Pa. D. & C.2d 221 (C.P. Phila. 1961)
(municipal ordinance which allows laymen to represent applicants before
city zoning board held unconstitutional). Cf. Kountz v. Rowlands, 90 P.L.J.
193 (Pa. C.P. 1942) (a layman may not represent others before city tax
board); Blair v. Motor Carriers Serv. Bureau, 40 Pa. D. & C. 413 (C.P. Phila.
1939) (corporation may not represent clients before regulatory commis-
sion). The practice of law in Pennsylvania includes the representation of
others before any judicial or quasi-judicial tribunal. Id. Logically, then,
this extends to representation of others even at the justice of the peace
level in Pennsylvania, lay representation at this level therefore constituting
unauthorized practice.
69. See cases cited in note 68 supra.
70. See, e.g., Childs v. Smeltzer, 315 Pa. 9, 171 A. 883 (1934); Blair v.
Motor Carriers Serv. Bureau, 40 Pa. D. & C. 413 (C.P. Phila. 1939); North-
hampton County Bar Ass'n v. Young, 26 North. 363 (Pa. C.P. 1939).
71. See Dauphin County Bar Ass'n v. Mazzacaro, 96 Dauph. 372 (Pa.
identification of these activities by the courts, it also has been judi-
cially recognized that it is impossible to draw any precise defini-
tion of what constitutes the practice of law.72 Thus, it has also been
held that it is similarly difficult to define with precision what ser-
vices a nonlawyer may or may not render without engaging in the
unauthorized practice of law.73 The services that have been identi-
fied as beyond the scope of the nonlawyer in Pennsylvania include
the following: representation of persons before judicial or quasi-
judicial bodies;7 4 preparation for others of "legal" documents such
as corporate charters,75 official forms calling for statutory interpre-
tations,76 or emigration papers;7 7 engaging in the business of draw-
ing such instruments as wills, trusts, and deeds;78 and actively
counselling persons as to their rights and obligations under Pennsyl-
vania 79 or federal law.80
In spite of the fact that past instances of unauthorized practice
in Pennsylvania lend themselves to the neat pigeonholes of lay
representation, drafting of documents, and counselling of clients,81
"unauthorized practice," to be a meaningful term for measuring lay
conduct and for determining lawyer adherence to DR 3-101 (A) must
be predicated upon some identifiable criteria beside the failure of
the acting party to have been admitted to practice. Such criteria can
be set forth by asking two questions: first, what constitutes the
rendering of a legal service; secondly, what course of conduct consti-
tutes the "practice" of law. The first question arises because too
frequently the needs of business and law overlap, with each requir-
ing a certain knowledge of the other.8 2 The second arises because
there is conflict about whether protection of the public interest de-
C.P. 1974); Blair v. Motor Carriers Serv. Bureau, 40 Pa. D. & C. 413 (C.P.
Phila. 1939).
72. See Kountz v. Rowlands, 90 P.L.J. 193, 197 (Pa. C.P. 1942); Blair
v. Motor Carriers Serv. Bureau, 40 Pa. D. & C. 413, 422-23 (C.P. Phila.
1939); see also Shortz v. Farrell, 327 Pa. 81, 193 A. 20 (1937).
73. See Blair v. Motor Carriers Serv. Bureau, 40 Pa. D. & C. 413,
423 (C.P. Phila. 1939).
74. See cases cited in note 68 supra.
75. See Blair v. Motor Carriers Serv. Bureau, 40 Pa. D. & C. 413
(C.P. Phila. 1939).
76. See Blair v. Motor Carriers Serv. Bureau, 40 Pa. D & C. 413, 426,
429 (C.P. Phila. 1939); Walker v. Kahn, 31 Pa. D. & C. 620, 626 (C.P. Allegh.
1938).
77. See McCarthy v. Panaccio, 49 Pa. D. & C.2d 501 (C.P. Phila.
1969).
78. See Childs v. Smeltzer, 315 Pa. 9, 171 A. 883 (1934); Burch v. Mel-
lor, 43 Pa. D. & C. 597 (C.P. Phila. 1942).
79. See Dauphin County Bar Ass'n v. Mazzacaro, 96 Dauph. 372 (Pa.
C.P. 1974); Blair v. Motor Carriers Serv. Bureau, 40 Pa. D. & C. 413 (C.P.
Phila. 1939).
80. See Ginsburg v. Kovrak, 392 Pa. 143, 139 A.2d 889 (1958).
81. See notes 69-80 and accompanying text supra.
82. See PA-IsoN 370-71; Resh, The Bar's Duty to Prevent Unau-
thorized Practice, 30 U.P. NEWS 177, 182-83 (1964); see also LaBrum v.
Commonwealth Title Co., 358 Pa. 239, 56 A.2d 246 (1948).
Note
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mands that any instance of lay rendering of legal service be
punished or whether the public interest remains safe so long as
no course of conduct or "practice" of law has taken place. How
a jurisdiction deals with the preceding questions determines both
how it defines the public interest and how it views lay involve-
ment in traditional areas of legal practice. Although no two juris-
dictions are alike in their approach to the questions of what consti-
tutes a legal service and what constitutes the practice of law, at
least two general approaches can be identified.
The stricter approach views any service by a nonlawyer that
duplicates services traditionally rendered by any attorney as a
legal service and as unauthorized,8 3 no matter how simple the
act 84 and no matter whether a fee is charged.8 5 It also refuses to
look for a course of conduct when condemning unauthorized prac-
tice; even an isolated service by a nonlawyer is considered unlaw-
ful "practice" warranting prosecution. 6 This view of unauthorized
practice sees the public interest as demanding unyielding protec-
tion from any form of unauthorized legal service, regardless of the
simplicity of the act or the innocent intent behind it.87 This view
8
rejects the justification given by some state courts 9 for marginal
lay involvement in providing incidental legal services when cus-
tom or public need calls for such services. Thus the first approach
to unauthorized practice draws a distinction between public interest
and public need.
The second approach taken by certain jurisdictions including
Pennsylvania90 is more flexible in its view of what activities lay-
men may properly engage in without being liable for unauthorized
practice. Thus, rather than label as a legal service any work
83. Arizona v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76, 366 P.2d
1 (1961); In re Baker, 8 N.J. 321, 85 A.2d 505 (1951); see also Florida v.
Am. Legal & Business Forms, Inc., 274 So. 2d 225 (Fla. 1973).
84. See Arizona v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76, 366 P.2d
1 (1961).
85. See Idaho v. Meservy, 80 Idaho 504, 335 P.2d 62 (1959); In re
Baker, 84 N.J. 321, 85 A.2d 505 (1951).
86. See In re Baker, 8 N.J. 321, 85 A.2d 505 (1951).
87. See Arizona v. Arizona Land Title & Trust Co., 90 Ariz. 76, 366 P.2d
1 (1961); In re Baker, 8 N.J. 321, 85 A.2d 505 (1951); see also Argan v. Sha-
piro, 127 Cal. App. 2d 807, 273 P.2d 619' (1954).
88. See cases cited in note 87 supra.
89. See, e.g., People v. Jersin, 101 Colo. 406, 74 P.2d 668 (1937); La-
Brum v. Commonwealth Title Co., 358 Pa. 239, 56 A.2d 246 (1948); see also
In re Opinion of the Justices, 284 Mass. 607, 194 N.E. 313 (1935); People
v. Title Guarantee & Trust Co., 227 N.Y. 366, 125 N.E. 666 (1919).
90. See cases cited in note 89 supra.
commonly rendered by attorneys,91 this approach holds that only
those services requiring legal training, knowledge, and skills be-
yond those of the average man may be considered legal services.92
It also rejects the notion that the commission of an isolated ser-
vice, itself requiring skills beyond that of the average man, is
sufficient to show that the actor was engaged in the "practice"
of rendering legal services and, therefore, guilty of unauthor-
ized practice. 3 On the contrary, what is demanded for proof of
unauthorized practice is a clear course of conduct whose totality of
acts indicates a habitual, unauthorized rendering of such services
that are beyond the skill of the average layman.9 4 This approach,
as reflected in Pennsylvania decisional law, therefore, holds that to
be guilty of unauthorized practice a layman must be both engaged
in rendering services clearly requiring professional legal skills and
engaged in a distinct course of rendering such services. 95
From this flexible approach has evolved in Pennsylvania a
"business exception rule" or "rule of convenience"9 6 with regard
to lay rendering of legal service. Decisions acknowledging this
rule, while adhering to the dictate that unauthorized practice must
not be condoned,9 7 do recognize that laymen in business are fre-
quently required on their own to deal with specific legal prob-
lems as a matter of convenience both to themselves and to their
customers.98 It has thus been held that laymen may properly
provide others with business advice involving resolution of minor
legal problems99 and that, specifically, realtors may draw for clients
such documents as simple deeds and mortgages. 100 These activities
91. See Blair v. Motor Carriers Serv. Bureau, 40 Pa. D. & C. 413,
423 (C.P. Phila. 1939).
92. See, e.g., Dauphin County Bar Ass'n v. Mazzacaro, 96 Dauph. 372,
377 (Pa. C.P. 1974); Kountz v. Rowlands, 46 Pa. D. & C. 461, 463 (C.P.
Allegh. 1942); Blair v. Motor Carriers Serv. Bureau, 40 Pa. D. & C. 413, 423
(C.P. Phila. 1939); cf. EC 3-5.
93. See Childs v. Smeltzer, 315 Pa. 9, 14, 171 A. 883, 885 (1934); In
re Umble's Estate, 117 Pa. Super. 15, 21, 177 Pa. 340, 342, affd, 323 Pa. 170,
186 A. 75 (1936); Kountz v. Rowlands, 46 Pa. D. & C. 461, 462 (C.P. Allegh.
1942); Northhampton County Bar Ass'n v. Young, 26 North. 363 (Pa. C.P.
1939).
94. See Childs v. Smeltzer, 315 Pa. 9, 171 A. 883 (1934); Kountz v.
Rowlands, 46 Pa. D. & C. 461 (C.P. Allegh. 1942); Blair v. Motor Carriers
Serv. Bureau, 40 Pa. D. & C. 413 (C.P. Phila. 1939); but see In re Drew's
Estate, 32 Pa. D. & C. 297 (Orphan's Ct. Phila. 1938).
95. See cases cited in note 94 supra.
96. See Blair v. Motor Carriers Serv. Bureau, 40 Pa. D. & C. 413,
422-23 (C.P. Phila. 1939); see also LaBrum v. Commonwealth Title Co., 358
Pa. 239, 56 A.2d 246 (1948); Shortz v. Farrell, 327 Pa. 81, 193 A. 20 (1937);
cf. Childs v. Smeltzer, 315 Pa. 9, 171 A. 883 (1934).
97. See, e.g., Dauphin County Bar Ass'n v. Mazzacaro, 96 Dauph. 372,
377 (Pa. C.P. 1974); Liebtag v. Dilworth, 25 Pa. D. & C.2d 221, 241 (C.P.
Phila. 1961).
98. See cases cited in note 96 supra.
99. See Blair v. Motor Carriers Serv. Bureau, 40 Pa. D. & C. 413,
422-23 (C.P. Phila. 1939); cf. In re Bereu, 273 A.D. 524, 78 N.Y.S.2d 209
(1948).
100. See LaBrum v. Commonwealth Title Co., 358 Pa. 239, 56 A.2d 246
Note
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are allowed under the rule so long as they remain mere incidents
of the layman's actual business and are neither services separately
charged for nor pursued as independent occupations.10 ' Further-
more, this rule rejects the notion that it is merely the uncompli-
cated nature of the service offered that frees the layman from
scrutiny for unauthorized practice. 0 2 Rather, it is both that the
service is within the customary knowledge of the businessman
so rendering it, and that it is given as a mere adjunct to the actual
service the client seeks from the layman.10 3 It is submitted, more-
over, that the "rule of convenience" still safeguards the public
from the layman acting beyond his expected skills and from the
layman attempting to hold himself out as qualified to render legal
service as a separable occupation. The rule, as an expression of
Pennsylvania's approach to the question of lay practice, acknowl-
edges both the public interest in protection from the unqualified
practitioner and the public need for convenient resolution of minor
legal problems that arise during business transactions. 0 4 The
offense known as unauthorized practice is no less an offense in
Pennsylvania than in other jurisdictions,'0 5 but a flexible,10
case-by-case approach'0 7 to the issue of unauthorized practice has
helped to avoid some of the more draconian results reached in other
states.
08
(1948); In re Umble's Estate, 117 Pa. Super. 15, 177 A. 340 (1935); Ingham
County Bar Ass'n v. Walter Neller Co., 242 Mich. 214, 69 N.W.2d 713 (1955).
101. See cases cited in note 96 supra.
102. See Blair v. Motor Carriers Serv. Bureau, 40 Pa. D. & C. 413,
422-23 (C.P. Phila. 1939).
103. See cases cited in note 96 supra. Cf. Creekmore v. Izard, 236 Ark.
558, 367 S.W.2d 419 (1963); Conway-Bogue Realty v. Denver Bar, 135 Colo.
398, 312 P.2d 998 (1957); Oregon State Bar v. John H. Miller & Co., 235
Or. 341, 385 P.2d 181 (1963).
104. It has been argued that the so-called "rule of convenience" or
"business exception" (to the prohibitions against the lay provision of legal
services) should be extended to allow paralegals to provide indigents with
basic legal services. See Comment, Legal Paraprofessionals and Unau-
thorized Practice, 8 HARv. Civ. RIGHTs-Crv. LIB. L. REV. 104 (1973).
105. For a recent and most vehement denunciation of unauthorized
practice see Dauphin County Bar Ass'n v. Mazzacaro, 96 Dauph. 372, 377
(Pa. C.P. 1974).
106. See notes 90-104 and accompanying text supra.
107. Blair v. Motor Carriers Serv. Bureau, 40 Pa. D. & C. 413, 423 (C.P.
Phila. 1939).
108. See cases cited in note 87 supra. However, despite Pennsylvania's
liberality toward the issues of business cum minor legal advice and drafting
of incidental legal documents, see notes 114-15 and accompanying text
supra, no decision in Pennsylvania condones a layman representing an-
other party before a judicial or quasi-judicial hearing, whether the lay rep-
resentative has an actual "interest" in the matter in issue or not. See cases
(2) Violation of DR 3-101 (A) -Aiding Unauthorized Practice
To date there have been relatively few disciplinary actions at
the judicial level, in or out of Pennsylvania, regarding the ethical
violation known as aiding the unauthorized practice of law.10 9
One reason for the seeming rarity of this canon violation may be
that many courts tend to view unauthorized practice as the product
of lay misconduct only incidentally abetted by attorneys.110 It is
submitted that, despite the paucity of violations on record, at least
three areas for potential infringement of the prohibition against aid-
ing unauthorized practice can be identified. These three areas are
naturally synonymous with the three types of attorney-layman re-
lationships, that is to say, with those relationships in which the at-
torney employs, is employed by, or acts in association with a non-
lawyer. The first relationship and area for potential infgringement
concerns attorney employment of both regular office staff (secre-
taries,11" ' law clerks,11 2 and paralegals"') and special personnel
(accountants," 4 investigators,"5 and adjusters"16). The second
type of relationship mentioned, the attorney as actual employee
of a layman, usually manifests itself when the attorney is a staff
employee of a service corporation, 1 7 membership organiza-
tion,118  or bank.119  The last type of relationship identified
above concerns those attorney-layman associations in which the
cited in note 68 supra. Whether the use of lay representatives is tolerated
at the lower judicial or quasi-judicial levels, i.e. at the district justice or
city administrative commission level, is another question. However, as a
tentative reply, it is submitted that such lay representation is often con-
doned sub silentio at these minor tribunals.
109. See generally, AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE
HANDBOOK (1972).
110. See State v. Schumacher, 214 Kan. 1, 519 P.2d 1116 (1974); Rosen-
thal v. Shepard Broadcasting, 299 Mass. 286, 12 N.E.2d 819 (1938); Blair v.
Motor Carriers Serv. Bureau, 40 Pa. D. & C. 413 (C.P. Phila. 1939); State
v. Hardy, 61 Wyo. 172, 156 P.2d 309 (1945).
111. See In re Marino, 20 N.Y.2d 176, 179, 282 N.Y.S.2d 230, 233, 229
N.E.2d 23, 25 (1967); cf. Childs v. Smeltzer, 315 Pa. 9, 171 A. 883 (1934).
112. See Crawford v. State Bar, 54 CaL 2d 659, 7 Cal. Rptr. 746, 355 P.2d
490 (1960); In re Christianson, 215 N.W.2d 920 (N.D. 1974); Ferris v.
Snively, 172 Wash. 167, 19 P.2d 942 (1933).
113. See Comment, Legal Paraprofessionals and Unauthorized Practice,
8 HARv. Civ. RiGHTs-Cv. La. L. REv. 104 (1973).
114. See ABA Op. 297.
115. Cf. Dauphin County Bar Ass'n v. Mazzacaro, 96 Dauph. 372 (Pa.
C.P. 1974).
116. See State v. Swidler, 159 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1964); In re Marino, 20
N.Y.2d 179, 282 N.Y.S.2d 230, 229 N.E.2d 23 (1967); State Bar v. Lewis, -
W. Va. -, 197 S.E.2d 312 (1973).
117. See Blair v. Motor Carriers Serv. Bureau, 40 Pa. D. & C. 413
(C.P. Phila. 1939).
116. See People v. Ass'n of Real Estate Taxpayers, 354 Ill. 102, 187 N.E.
823 (1933); In re Maclub of America, 295 Mass. 45, 3 N.E.2d 272 (1936).
119. See Arkansas Bar Ass'n v. Union Nat. Bank of Little Rock, 224 Ark.
48, 273 S.W.2d 408 (1954); In re Otterness, 181 Minn. 254, 232 N.W. 318




attorney acts as a consultant, 120 partner,' or associate 22 of a non-
lawyer who deals with the public. Thus, because attorney en-
couragement of or acquiescence in certain lay conduct within any
of the above-mentioned relationships may lead to violation of DR
3-101 (A), it becomes an attorney's responsibility to scrutinize his
own role within the meaning of the dictates under Canon 3.123
When the attorney stands as employer in the lawyer-layman
relationship, at least two kinds of lay activity may serve as
antecedents to violation of DR 3-101 (A). The first kind of lay
employee activity includes those office tasks of a legal12 4 nature
that are delegated by the attorney-employer and whose work
product will be put to use by or on behalf of a particular client.
Among such tasks are the preparation of legal memoranda, the pre-
paration of pleadings, and the drawing of deeds, wills, and other
legal documents.125 Because this type of office work is law
related, i.e. requires legal training and skill beyond that of the ordi-
nary layman,126 and does not come within the "business excep-
tion" or "rule of convenience," its performance by lay employees,
without more, would constitute unauthorized practice. 127 The
second type of lay employee activity involves those situations in
which the employee directly serves or communicates with a client,
outside the presence of an attorney. 28 Unless such service or
communication is of a nonlegal nature or is merely a reiteration
of a legal conclusion dictated by the attorney-employer, the em-
120. See, e.g., In re Tuthill, 256 A.D. 539, 10 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1939).
121. See, e.g., State v. Willenson, 20 Wis. 2d 519, 123 N.W.2d 452 (1963);
see also ABA Op. 297; DR 3-103 (forming a partnership with a layman).
122. See State v. Schumacher, 214 Kan. 1, 519 P.2d 1116 (1974); Colum-
bus Bar Ass'n v. Agee, 175 Ohio 443, 196 N.E.2d 98 (1964); In re Little, 247
Or. 503, 431 P.2d 284 (1967); In re Werblum, 22 Pa. D. & C. 617 (C.P. Phila.
1935); In re C., 26 Del. 45 (Pa. C.P. 1933); see also ABA Op. 272; ABA Inf.
544; DR 3-102 (dividing legal fees with a non-lawyer); note 39 supra.
123. See generally, Resh, People on the Fringe: The Relationship of
Professional Ethics to Unauthorized Practice, 26 U.P. NEws 185 (1960).
124. See notes 90-95 and accompanying text supra for a discussion
of what constitutes a legal service.
125. See Crawford v. State Bar, 54 Cal. 2d 659, 7 Cal. Rptr. 746, 355 P.2d
490 (1960); In re Marino, 20 N.Y.2d. 176, 282 N.Y.S.2d 230, 229 N.E.2d 23
(1967); Childs v. Smeltzer, 315 Pa. 9, 171 A. 883 (1934).
126. See cases cited in note 94 supra.
127. See notes 96-104 and accompanying text supra.
128. See State v. Swidler, 159 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1964); State v. Schu-
macher, 214 Kan. 1, 519 P.2d 1116 (1974); In re Marino, 20 N.Y.2d 176, 282
N.Y.S.2d 230, 229 N.E.2d 23 (1967); State v. Hardy, 61 Wyo. 172, 156 P.2d
309 (1945); cf. Dauphin County Bar Ass'n v. Mazzacaro, 96 Dauph. 372 (Pa.
C.P. 1974); Blair v. Motor Carriers Serv. Bureau, 40 Pa. D. & C. 413 (C.P.
Phila. 1939).
ployee would be guilty of unauthorized practice.129  Although a
precise line often cannot be drawn between an employee's non law-
related and law-related tasks,130 if his law-related activities are not
supervised, managed, or reviewed by the attorney-employer, the
public is exposed to legal services from unqualified and per-
haps incompetent persons, 13 1 the very danger that Canon 3 and
the law seek to avoid. 1 2 Therefore, the lawyer who allows his
employees to perform law-related tasks without direction or review
or permits employees to communicate with clients on law-related
matters without supervision 13 3 will be guilty of aiding unauthorized
practice.
3 4
When the layman is the employer in the attorney-layman
relationship, violation of the strictures against aiding the unauthor-
ized practice of law usually requires more than mere attorney ac-
quiescence in some type of lay conduct. On the contrary, the
attorney must take an active role toward making unauthorized
practice by the lay employer possible.13 5 Thus, when an attorney
is employed by a layman, organization, or corporation, he may prop-
erly render legal advice, provide representation, or prepare legal
documents for his employer when the employer is a party in
interest to the transaction requiring those legal services.13 What
the lawyer must avoid, however, is allowing his employer either
to exploit his services by selling them to the public,8 7 or to act as
an intermediary' 51  between the lawyer and the true party
in interest, the client. 13 9 Therefore, a lawyer may not provide his
129. See cases cited in note 128 supra.
130. Ferris v. Snively, 172 Wash. 167, 176-77, 19 P.2d 942, 945-45 (1933).
131. See cases cited in notes 125 and 128 supra; see also In re Christian-
son, 215 N.W.2d 920, 927 (N.D. 1970).
132. See EC 3-1 to -4.
133. See Crawford v. State Bar, 54 Cal. 2d 659, 7 Cal. Rptr. 746, 355 P.2d
490 (1960); In re Marino, 20 N.Y.2d 176, 282 N.Y.S. 2d 230, 229 N.E.2d 23
(1967).
134. See EC 3-6.
135. The only exception to this arises when the attorney permits the
employer to use his name in the employer' advertisements, signs or letter-
heads. Such use constitutes both touting and a holding out that the em-
ployer, despite the lay status, is entitled to provide legal services to the
public. See, e.g., ABA Op. 31, 41, 68; ABA Inf. 799.
136. See Arkansas Bar Ass'n v. Union Nat. Bank of Little Rock, 224
Ark. 48, 273 S.W.2d 408 (1954); In re Otterness, 181 Minn. 254, 232 N.W. 318
(1930); see also Industrial Val. Bank & Trust Co. v. Miller Realty Dev. Co.,
44 Pa. D. & C.2d 207 (1968).
137. See Lowell Bar Ass'n v. Loeb, 315 Mass. 176, 186, 52 N.E.2d 27, 35
(1943); In re L.R., 7 N.J. 390, 81 A.2d 725 (1951); see also In re Maclub,
295 Mass. 45, 3 N.E.2d 272 (1936).
138. See People v. Ass'n of Real Estate Taxpayers, 354111. 102, 187 N.E.
823 (1933); In re X, 21 N.J. 281, 121 A.2d 489 (1956); Stack v. P.G. Garage,
Inc., 7 N.J. 118, 80 A.2d 545 (1951); Blair v. Motor Carriers Serv. Bureau,
40 Pa. D. & C. 413, 425 (C.P. Phila. 1939); In re Otterness, 181 Minn. 254,
232 N.W. 318 (1930).
139. There are several exceptions to the rule prohibiting an attorney
from allowing a company, organization, or corporation to offer the attor-
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employer with legal services responsive to the particular needs of
a third party, in order that the employer may then relay these ser-
vices to the third party, i.e. to the one standing as customer or
client of the employer himself.140 Nor may the attorney-em-
ployee permit his employer to tout him as a resource or referral
for those customers seeking the direct advice or services of an
attorney.
141
In the first situation portrayed above the lawyer has allowed
the employer to adopt the lawyer's work product as his own and
thus to mislead the public into believing that the employer is quali-
fied to provide legal assistance.142  In the second situation,
though it may have been made clear that it is the lawyer-employee
who is rendering legal services to the public and not the em-
ployer,148 the attorney, nevertheless, has allowed his employer to
act as an intermediary between the attorney and the customer-
client and to divide the lawyer's necessary allegiance to that
client. 44 Therefore, in both situations the attorney-employee has
aided the lay employer to manage directly of indirectly the attor-
ney's services and to participate as an instrumental factor in the
rendition of legal services to the public, i.e. to share in the practice
of law. By his actions the attorney must be held guilty of aiding
the unauthorized practice of law by a nonlawyer.
The third type of attorney-layman relationship arises when
the attorney stands as consultant, 14 associate 46 or implicit part-
ner 147 of a layman or lay organization. When the attorney
ney's services to the public. The first exception arises where the services
offered are those which the company itself could, under the "rule of conven-
ience," properly render to the public; see Bar Ass'n of Tennessee v. Union
Planters Guar. Co., 46 Tenn. App. 100, 326 S.W.2d 767 (1959); see also notes
111-19 and accompanying text supra. A second exception allows an
attorney's services to be offered to the public through certain non-profit
organizations; see In re Washington-Greene Legal Aid Society, 45 Pa. D. &
C.2d 563 (C.P. Wash. 1968); see also DR2-103(D). A third exception per-
mits an attorney to be employed on staff or by referral by an organization
or union, for benefit of members needing representation or legal advice,
when the need for such services arises out of the broad associational purpose
of the organization; see, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar
Ass'n, 389 U.S. 219 (1967); N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
140. See cases cited in note 137 supra.
141. See cases cited in note 138 supra.
142. See cases cited in note 137 supra.
143. See cases cited in note 138 supra.
144. See eases cited in notes 137 and 138 supra.
145. See, e.g., in re Tuthill, 256 A.D. 539, 10 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1939).
146. See cases cited in note 122 supra.
147. See, e.g., State v. Willenson, 20 Wis. 2d 519, 123 N.W.2d 452 (1963);
see also ABA Op. 297. The formation of any functioning partnership be-
permits his name to be used to attract legal clients for the
non-lawyer,1 48  or actively solicits legal clients for the non-
lawyer,'1 49 he has aided his lay associate in the unauthorized practice
of law and committed a fraud on the public. 50 Such situations
arise most often when a disbarred or suspended lawyer without
reinstatement attempts to resume practice by having an attorney
in good standing lend his name to the suspended lawyer's un-
authorized practice,15 1 solicit or forward clients, 5 2 or allow the
suspended lawyer to practice under the guise of serving as the
authorized attorney's law clerk.' 53 Because a disbarred or sus-
pended lawyer is not allowed to perform even those legal ser-
vices permitted a layman under the "rule of convenience,"
'1 4
it has been held that an attorney in good standing who assists a
disbarred or suspended lawyer in the covert practice of law has
himself committed the most blatant violation possible of the
prohibition against aiding unauthorized practice. 5 It is in such
associations or implicit partnerships between attorneys and lay-
men that the greatest potential for both unauthorized practice and
violation of DR 3-101 (A) exists.
What remains to be discussed is the attorney culpability needed
for a violation of DR 3-101 (A) to be proved. Certainly what must
first be shown is that a layman did engage in unauthorized prac-
tice. In Pennsylvania this would mean that a layman did en-
gage in a course of providing services requiring legal knowledge
beyond the skill of the ordinary layman;8 6 and that these serv-
ices were not those normally incidental or related to the lay-
tween lawyer and layman is a per se violation of DR 3-103 if any of the
partnership activities consists of the practice of law. The reason for this
rule is the bar's desire to avoid situations which would permit the lay part-
ner to exercise any influence which would dilute the lawyer's allegiance to
his client; see ABA CANON 33; DR 3-103; cf. DR 5-107; see generally WISE
200-02 (1970). Thus, because such a partnership allows the lay partner to
partake and profit from the practice of law, the attorney in the relationship
is guilty of violation of DR 3-101 (A) and violation of DR 3-103; cf. ABA Op.
297; NEw YORK CouNTY LAwYERs ASS'N OP. 445.
148. See, e.g., In re Venezio, 28 N.J. 580, 147 A.2d 792 (1959).
149. See, e.g., Crawford v. State Bar of California, 54 Cal. 2d 659, 7 Cal.
Rptr. 746, 355 P.2d 490 (1960); In re Christianson, 215 N.W.2d 920 (N.D.
i 7O).
150. See Crawford v. State Bar of California, 54 Cal. 2d 659, 7 Cal. Rptr.
746, 750-55, 355 P.2d 490, 494 (1960).
151. See In re Venezio, 28 N.J. 580, 147 A.2d 792 (1959); In re C., 26
Del. 45 (Pa. C.P. 1933).
152. See State v. Schumacher, 214 Kan. 1, 519 P.2d 1116 (1974); In re
C., 26 Del. 45 (Pa. C.P. 1933).
153. See Crawford v. State Bar of California, 54 Cal. 2d 659, 7 Cal. Rptr.
746, 355 P.2d 490 (1960); In re Christianson, 215 N.W.2d 920 (N.D. 1970).
154. See State v. Schumacher, 214 Kan. 1, 16, 519 P.2d 1116, 1125 (1974);
State v. Butterfield, 172 Neb. 645, 649, 111 N.W.2d 543, 546-47 (1961).
155. See Crawford v. State Bar of California, 54 Cal. 2d 659, 7 Cal. Rptr.
746, 355 P.2d 490 (1960); In re C., 26 Del. 45 (Pa. C.P. 1933).
156. See notes 89-95 and accompanying text supra.
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man's business. 15 7 What must next be shown is that the attorney
in question is somehow responsible for, i.e. has "aided," the
layman's unauthorized practice. 158 Naturally, the degree of attor-
ney -responsibility for the alleged unauthorized practice depends
upon the type of attorney-layman relationship that exists.
It is submitted that when the attorney stands as employer to
the layman, standard agency principles should govern the degree
of attorney responsibility for his employee's acts. Thus, when the
attorney has a clear right of control over his employee's work, the
public interest would demand that the attorney be held ultimately
accountable for the employee's unintentional or intentional acts of
unauthorized practice. When the employee operates beyond the
knowledge and control of the attorney-employer, however, account-
ability for conduct is obviously lessened. In contrast, when the
attorney is an employee of a layman or lay organization, he should
be held to a high degree of responsibility in all circumstances since
without his services made available at the direction of the lay
employer, the unauthorized practice could not take place. Only in
the extreme situation in which an employer, without the knowledge
of the attorney, appropriates the attorney's advice or work product
and makes it available to others, should the attorney be relieved of
responsibility. Finally, when the attorney stands as a willing part-
ner, co-equal, or associate in the attorney-layman relationship, and
allows himself to be used in order that the layman may accomplish
indirectly what he could not accomplish directly, i.e. practice law,
the attorney may be held absolutely accountable for the layman's
unauthorized practice. Absolute culpability is demanded because
it is the attorney's concerted actions with the layman that have
made the unauthorized practice possible. Thus in the three rela-
tionships described, attorney culpability increases as the attorney's
knowledge of and responsibility for the layman's course of conduct
itself increases.
Finally, it can be questioned whether the public interest
demands that attorney violation of DR 3-101 (A) merits the same
punishment in all situations. In jurisdictions in which unauthorized
practice itself is not seen as a crime against the public interest,
determination of attorney punishment may depend on whether
the attorney negligently or willingly aided unauthorized prac-
tice. Severity of punishment might also depend on whether the
unauthorized practice in a particular situation represents the fol-
157. See notes 96-104 and accompanying text supra.
158. See notes 109-55 and accompanying text supra.
lowing: fraud on a particular client, as when the unauthorized
practitioner is an attorney's employee who directly or indirectly
serves a client;1 9 fraud on the public, as when the unauthorized
practitioner is the attorney's employer who holds himself out to
the public; 18 0 or fraud on the courts, as when the unauthorized
practitioner is a disbarred or suspended lawyer who uses the attor-
ney to further his illicit law practice.""
The preceding speculations, however, remain merely specula-
tions because the Code stands silent on the question of measuring
culpability under Canon 3. Furthermore, the courts themselves
have never clearly determined if the public interest recognizes de-
grees of culpability of DR 3-101 (A). Compounding this lack of clear
precedent is the fact that the courts frequently mete unequal pun-
ishment between the unauthorized practitioner and the attorney
who aided the unauthorized practice, often ignoring the attorney
while punishing the guilty layman. 1 2 It remains therefore to fu-
ture revisions of the Code or future case law to establish the inter-
nal parameters of DR 3-101 (A).
III. CONCLUSION
Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility repre-
sents one effort to give organization and focus to a pre-exist-
ing body of legal ethics relating to unauthorized practice. The con-
siderations and rules under the canon are allegedly an attempt to
embody both aspirational and prohibitory standards of the profes-
sion. Thus, in condemning unauthorized practice the canon speaks
both of the public interest in qualified legal services and the pro-
fession's duty not to aid the unauthorized practice of law. Despite
the canon's interest in such matters, however, it fails to address
itself to the questions of why unauthorized practice arises and pre-
cisely what attorney conduct contributes to such practice. Rather,
the canon and the Code seem to leave such issues to resolution
by local law, a challenge the various jurisdictions have so far failed
to meet. Therefore, until the bar or the courts produce a coherent
delineation of Canon 3, its interpretation must rest on its own
nebulous pronouncements and on the sparse patchwork of opinions
relating to both unauthorized practice and attorney violation of DR
3-101(A). It is also apparent that attorney understanding of the de-
mands of Canon 3 must similarly rest on this inadequate founda-
tion.
What can be perceived, though, is that breach of DR 3-101 (A)
159. See notes 124-34 and accompanying text supra.
160. See notes 135-44 and accompanying text supra.
161. See notes 145-55 and accompanying text supra.
162. See, e.g., State v. Schumacher, 214 Kan. 1, 519 P.2d 1116 (1974);
Blair v. Motor Carriers Serv. Bureau, 40 Pa. D. & C. 413 (C.P. Phila. 1939);
State v. Hardy, 61 Wyo, 172, 156.P.2d 309 (1945).
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depends both on what a jurisdiction defines as unauthorized prac-
tice and what professional relationship an attorney maintains with
the layman committing the unauthorized practice. The type of pro-
fessional relationship between attorney and layman, in turn, deter-
mines the attorney's duty not to aid any unauthorized practice of
law by the nonlawyer; in other words, the duty not to aid unauthor-
ized practice must be measured against attorney responsibility for
the lay conduct that may lead to unauthorized practice.
J. A. ALZAMORA
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